Keynes argues that a beauty contest in financial markets is a combination of rational higher-order beliefs and market psychology or animal spirits. We find that a stable equilibrium, where also market psychology is included, can be possible if uninformed investors agree to reduce their required rate of return indicating that they enlarge the risk of their investment with the animal spirits component.
INTRODUCTION
writes: "professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundreds of photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole". Keynes argues that investors' decisions in financial markets are affected by higher-order beliefs and he calls this phenomenon "beauty contest in the financial markets". He argues that the beauty contest can be divided into two effects: rational higher-order beliefs and market psychology. Shiller (2014) calls the latter component "animal spirits", and he follows Keynes (1921) in defining animal spirits as a "gut feeling that rises from the ambiguity of directly unobservable probabilities of future returns." , , and , among others, analyze the effect of animal spirits on the equilibrium price of a risky asset. Their basic assumption is that technical traders coordinate their actions, which results in a stable equilibrium. Furthermore, , Bacchetta and VanWincoop (2008) analyze only the effect of rational higherorder beliefs resulting in returns predictability in equilibrium. 2016b; 2017) connects rational higher order expectations and animal spirits in the same framework, and shows that the animal spirits component reduces expected returns for investors when the beauty contest is present. However, the returns depend on crucially on the level of the risk-free rate return. In these studies, one half of the rational investors are assumed as informed and the other half 1 Faculty of Management, FI-33014 University of Tampere, Finland. Phone number: +358401366117.
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The atomistic rational investors have asymmetric information so that 0  where P t is the equilibrium price, V t is the fundamental value, D t is dividend, E t is the expectations operator, and r f is the constant risk-free rate of return. In Samuelson's definition investors are assumed to be risk-neutral. In real life, however, a rational investor cares also about the risk of investment besides the reward. The risk in financial markets can be defined as the variation of returns, which leads to the well-known mean-variance paradigm (Markowitz 1952; Sharpe 1964) . Thus, a risk premium ω should be added. Shiller (2014) argues that stock markets seem to follow where t P is the equilibrium price, t V is the fundamental value, t D is operator, and f r is the constant risk-free rate of return. In Samuelson's d be risk-neutral. In real life, however, a rational investor cares also about t reward. The risk in financial markets can be defined as the variation of known mean-variance paradigm (Markowitz 1952; Sharpe 1964) . Thus, a r Shiller (2014) argues that stock markets seem to follow where denotes the risk premium, and t A denotes the animal spirits co higher order expectations is absent in this model.
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The atomistic rational investors have asymmetric information so that 0 investors and   1 is the share of uninformed investors in every period rational investors in every trading period: young informed and uninfo positions (demand at time t ) and old informed and uninformed investors w where ω denotes the risk premium, and A t denotes the animal spirits component. Note that the rational higher order expectations is absent in this model.
In this paper, the animal spirits component is specified by assuming coordinated actions of a large group of uninformed investors, and short-lived and risk-averse rational investors. The latter assumption is based on performance-based arbitrage, where the success in investing is monitored by short period intervals (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) .
Our basic finding is that the animal spirits component is present in a stable Keynesian beauty contest equilibrium only if the short-lived uninformed investors accept more risk compared to the case, where when only rational higher-order beliefs are present.
Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 describes the equilibrium with only rational higherorder beliefs. Section 3 presents the equilibrium, when also market psychology is included. Section 4 concludes.
THE MODEL
The model follows 2016b) . The economy consists of rational risk-averse (CARA, with equal tolerance of risk ν) investors who live for two periods, investing in period one, and consuming in period two. There is an infinitely lived risky asset (share of firm F) and a constant risk-free rate of return r f . The atomistic rational investors have asymmetric information so that 0 < μ < 1 is the share of informed investors and 1 -μ is the share of uninformed investors in every period. That is, there are four kinds of rational investors in every trading period: young informed and uninformed investors who open their positions (demand at time t) and old informed and uninformed investors who close their positions (supply at time t) Within the interval [0, 1] , there is a continuum of young and old investors in every period. The investors are constrained by wealth so that the young investors y at time t have the same initial wealth he animal spirits component is specified by assuming coordinated actions of a large group of vestors, and short-lived and risk-averse rational investors. The latter assumption is based on ased arbitrage, where the success in investing is monitored by short period intervals (Shleifer 97) .
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llows 2016b) . The economy consists of rational risk-averse (CARA, with e of risk  ) investors who live for two periods, investing in period one, and consuming in ere is an infinitely lived risky asset (share of firm F) and a constant risk-free rate of return . y, the natural logarithm of the dividend t D follows a random walk
. Short selling is available to young investors, and there are no transaction costs or taxes.
In the economy, the natural logarithm of the dividend D t follows a random walk where x is the demand for stock of young investors ) ( y and s is the supply of the stock by old investors ) (o . The equilibrium condition assures that demand per share is one in the equilibrium. Furthermore, we assume that the excess returns on the risky asset follow normal distribution. This assumption assures that the conditional variance of the excess returns is constant.
Equilibrium price with rational higher-order beliefs
A risk-averse young investor, who lives for two periods, maximizes his/her utility by allocating wealth between risky and risk-free assets. The net excess return on a risky share is
The young investor solves the maximization problem.  is the information set,  is the common coefficient of risk aversion, c is consumption, and y t w is the investor's initial wealth. The budget constraints read
, where x is the amount of money. Assume normally distributed extra consumption, (because of normally distributed excess returns), take expectations in Equation (2), and plug the consumption constraint into the utility function to get
. We assume that firm F pays D t to the investors at time t after trading, and that the dividend information is private. The informational advantage of the young informed investor derives from observing private information about D t , D t + 1 , D t + 2 and μ. The history of equilibrium prices (P t -1 , P t -2 , P t -3 , …) and the risk-free rate r f comprise information common to all investors. In addition, we assume noisy net supply of the stock by dumb traders (DU t ) distributed where x is the demand for stock of young investors ) ( y and s is the s ) (o . The equilibrium condition assures that demand per share is one in assume that the excess returns on the risky asset follow normal distributio conditional variance of the excess returns is constant.
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where where 2 r  is the variance of excess returns. Since the informed investors have better information about risky assets, it must be that (2) and note that the demand per risky asset's share is one in the equilibrium. Thus, the first order condition for the risky asset reads
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where the subscripts i and u refer to informed and uninformed investors, respectively. Solve forward by substituting out future prices. Then, as the horizon approaches infinity, Equation (4)
According to the properties of random walk, the change in the dividend at time t is perm Equation (7) Recall that the young (old) informed investors have private information about 2 1 , ,
Therefore, a young (old) informed investor solves the fundamental values 1 1 , ,
rational pricing rule for young and old investors is simply t t V P  because these atomistic investors have the same information and old (young) recognizes tha observes this. Notice that a young informed investor chooses his/her buy or sell position acco However, the uninformed investors observe only past equilibrium prices and the constant risk resulting in the equal risk premium u  and the required rate of return
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Given that μ is the share of the rational young and old informed investors and 1 -μ is the share of the uninformed investors, the rational choice equilibrium price in this economy is DOI: 10.7172/2353-6845.jbfe.2018.1.3
Given that  is the share of the rational young and old informed investors uninformed investors, the rational choice equilibrium price in this economy is
with the restriction of Equation (6). Thus, the larger is the proportion of info investors, the closer is the equilibrium price to the fundamental value.
As far as , 0   Equation (9) 
Solving u t C from Equation (10), we obtain
The uninformed investors observe only . Then, us , the difference
gives the optimal forecas
Following Equations (9), (11) and (12), the equilibrium price series follows
with the restriction of Equation (2). To prove that Equations (9) and (13) pr price t P manipulate Equation (12), to obtain
Taking the difference of sequential variables from Equation (9) yields Equ proves returns predictability (because it includes 1   t P ) in the equilibrium. Th (2006), Bacchetta and VanWincoop (2008) with rational higher-order beliefs
with the restriction of Equation (6). Thus, the larger is the proportion of informed investors among rational investors, the closer is the equilibrium price to the fundamental value. As far as 1 > μ > 0, Equation (9) implies that P t ≠ V t in every step suggesting that P t = V t + C t where C t describes all errors when P t ≠ V t (Shiller 2014) . In this economy, C t denotes the predictability in returns component implying that DOI: 10.7172/2353 DOI: 10.7172/ -6845.jbfe.2018 Note that the uninformed investors do not observe dividends.
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EQUILIBRIUM PRICE WITH ANIMAL SPIRITS
Equilibrium price with animal spirits
Following 2016b) Note that the overreaction can be positive or negative. In addition, we follow Santos and Wood by assuming that infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy. This is to say that t P and t V apart forever.
Additional Assumption 2: Infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy.
An informed investor observes that Equation (9) 
To find stable equilibrium conditions (Equation 15) , it is useful to analyze it in /  t t P P manipulation of Equation (15) 
However, according to the assumption that infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy, ther long-run equilibrium (because Note that the overreaction can be positive or negative. In addition, we follow Santos and Wood by assuming that infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy. This is to say that t P and t V apart forever.
To find stable equilibrium conditions (Equation 15) , it is useful to analyze it in /   t t P P manipulation of Equation (15) 
However, according to the assumption that infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy, there long-run equilibrium (because 
. Following , among others, we assume that the uninformed investors can coordinate their actions perfectly.
Additional Assumption 1:
Uninformed investors coordinate perfectly in their animal spirits component to obtain an identical product of A t , which is the product of overreacted demand for stock per share.
Note that the overreaction can be positive or negative. In addition, we follow Santos and Woodford (1997) by assuming that infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy. This is to say that P t and V t cannot drift apart forever.
Additional Assumption 2: Infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy.
An informed investor observes that Equation (9) does not hold at time t -1. Then, being rational (since P t and V t cannot drift apart forever), an informed investor i uses the cointegration results of giving the optimal forecast for the product of A t . Thus, we obtain DOI: 10.7172/2353 DOI: 10.7172/ -6845.jbfe.2018 3. Equilibrium price with animal spirits Following Ilomäki (2016a; 2016b) , suppose that the uninformed investo component t A in the pricing equation
suggesting that C (1990), among others, we assume that the uninformed investors can coor
Additional Assumption 1: Uninformed investors coordinate perfectly i obtain an identical product of t A , which is the product of overreacted de
Note that the overreaction can be positive or negative. In addition, we f by assuming that infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy. This apart forever.
Additional Assumption 2: Infinite bubbles are impossible in the econom
An informed investor observes that Equation (9) does not hold at time and t V cannot drift apart forever), an informed investor i uses the cointe (1987) giving the optimal forecast for the product of .
t A Thus, we obtain
Then, the equilibrium price series follows
To find stable equilibrium conditions (Equation 15), it is useful to manipulation of Equation (15), we have it as 
However, according to the assumption that infinite bubbles are impossib long-run equilibrium (because 
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Following 2016b) Note that the overreaction can be positive or negative. In addition, we follow Santos a by assuming that infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy. This is to say that apart forever.
Additional Assumption 2: Infinite bubbles are impossible in the economy.
However, according to the assumption that infinite bubbles are impossible in the econo long-run equilibrium (because 
To find stable equilibrium conditions (Equation 15) , it is useful to analyze it in ΔP t /P t -1 series. By manipulation of Equation (15) 
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